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Rapid developments continue to be made in the field of genetics and assisted reproductive 
technologies (ARTs).  Such developments can offer a much-desired lifeline to families 
wishing to create a healthy child.  However, varying opinions of legal, ethical, moral and 
social commentators on the use of the technologies are often difficult to reconcile.  As a 
result, regulators are faced with difficult decisions when deciding what to allow and who 
should be granted access to treatment.  Malcolm Smith’s book concentrates on one aspect of 
ARTs - the use of tissue-typing technology to identify and select compatible embryos which 
will be a match to an existing child, with the intention that the resulting child will be a tissue 
donor to help treat the existing child.  He terms these children ‘saviour children’ rather than 
‘saviour siblings’, recognising that the intended recipient of the tissue does not necessarily 
have to be a sibling, although surprisingly, he preserves the term ‘siblings’ in the title of his 
book (p 1).  Smith focuses on the regulatory systems in the UK and Australia to examine the 
restrictions placed on tissue-typing technology to create saviour children.  He argues that 
ethical and moral arguments should not be relied on to restrict access to the technology, 
except in the limited cases where there is evidence of ‘harm’ to the resulting child or to others 
(p 8).  
 
In Chapters 2 and 3, Smith examines the regulatory frameworks in the UK and Australia.1  
He identifies similarities between the two jurisdictions based on the harm principle used to 
justify restrictions to ARTs.  There are regional variations within the Australian model.  In 
New South Wales, for example, there was reference by the Legislative Council when passing 
the Bill to the need to ‘protect potential harm to society from the devaluation of human life 
and dignity’2 (p 17), whereas South Australia and Victoria refer to the welfare of any 
resulting child3 (pp 19-20).  In addition, there are restrictions on access to treatment, such as 
the requirement in South Australia that couples must be ‘medically infertile’ before being 
granted access to treatment.4  This requirement necessarily restricts access to tissue-typing 
treatment (p 27).  In contrast, the UK has a more clearly defined system of licensing.  There 
is a requirement for healthcare professionals to consider the welfare of the resulting child, or 
any other child.5  If they do not put systems in place to achieve this, they will not be granted a 
licence to deliver any type ART services.  Despite legal challenge,6 it is clear that licensing of 
tissue-typing technology falls within the remit of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority (HFEA), whose consideration of the welfare principle helps to determine access to 
treatment. 
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The HFEA has a presumption in favour of treatment, unless there is evidence that the 
resulting child or another child is at risk of significant harm or neglect, in which case those 
seeking treatment will be denied assistance (p 63).7 However, it is worth remembering that 
this presumption only operates in the field of treatment options available under licence at 
each clinic providing treatment.  Some treatments, such as sex selection other than to prevent 
a serious genetic disorder, remain prohibited and are, therefore, not subject to a harm-based 
analysis as they are not services currently available under licence from the HFEA.  If these 
activities become available in the future, they may not enjoy the same presumption in favour 
of treatment currently applied to ART services. 
 
In Australia, gaining access to tissue-typing treatment requires more scrutiny of applicants, 
with a set of criteria to satisfy before access will be granted, including consideration of the 
welfare and interests of the resulting child (p 67).8 The application of the welfare and harm 
principles in Australia and the UK are examined by Smith in Chapter 5 to challenge their use 
as a justification to restrict access to treatment in the context of creating saviour children.9  In 
Chapter 4 he also provides an examination of some of the moral and ethical concepts which 
underpin the restrictions placed on tissue-typing technology and access to treatment.10  Smith 
considers reproductive liberty to be central to the regulation of ARTs; thus, individuals 
affected by decisions are best placed to make those decisions without state interference (p 
84).  He notes that wider moral justifications for restricting liberty do not provide a strong 
basis for interfering with decision making, but does not open the debate about whether they 
should or are worthy of more consideration.  Instead, he goes further in the other direction 
and adopts John Stuart Mill’s approach to liberty, which requires not only freedom from legal 
barriers, but also freedom from social, intellectual, psychological and religious limitations.11  
Following this liberal view, Smith argues that matters concerning the individual should not 
be restricted by the legal enforcement of morals.  Rather, the harm principle, in this context, 
should be engaged at the point at which individual decision making could cause harm to 
others (p 86). Also relevant is the principle of autonomy, which overlaps with liberty.  Colin 
Gavaghan’s interpretation of autonomy as involving ‘independence from controlling 
influences’ and ‘capacity for intentional action’, are important to reproductive liberty as 
autonomy can be respected when the individual is at liberty to choose.12 
 
Smith argues that the liberal approach of non-interference with access to treatment in the 
absence of evidence of harm, provides a suitable starting point for reproductive decision 
making (p 96), with a presumption against state intrusion.  He supports this view citing John 
Roberston’s argument that reproduction is central to personal identity, meaning and dignity, 
and is therefore deserving of respect and should not be interfered with without very good 
reason.13  Unfortunately, Smith stops short of identifying and examining what ‘very good 
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reasons’ may be put forward by opponents of his approach.  He does, however, discuss the 
concept of ‘harm’.  Defining harm is not straightforward, and Smith examines Joel 
Feinberg’s work, who identifies harm as wrongfully setting back an individual’s interests.14  
Smith analyses the different types of interests that may be set back within the concept of the 
harm principle – ‘commercial-legal interests’ and ‘welfare interests’, which can be set back if 
those affected by the decision (in this case by granting access to treatment) are put in a worse 
condition than they would have been in had the interference not occurred.  Smith argues that 
interference with reproductive liberty is a form of harm, particularly when as in Australia, 
state imposed eligibility criteria restrict access to treatment, for example when a couple is 
seeking tissue typing treatment when they are not medically infertile.15  Such harm could 
only be justified where it could be shown that the interests of others could be wrongfully set 
back in a way which outweighs the harm (p 119), although Smith does not give any examples 
or suggestions of who else might be harmed and in what way.  In order to predict whether a 
harm may arise, Smith advocates a risk assessment approach - the likelihood of the harm 
arising balanced against the severity of the harm which could be caused (p 122).  This 
approach avoids the need for a blanket prohibition on services, and it allows for less 
restrictive measures to be provided in order to minimise the risk of harm or seriousness of 
harm, such as the provision of information or counselling. 
 
Applying the concept of harm directly to the creation of saviour children, Smith notes that the 
HFEA position is that harm must be assessed at the pre-conception stage.16 The liberal 
approach advocated by Smith requires that the risk or likelihood of the harm eventuating 
must be more than a minimal risk, and that the resulting harm more than a minor harm (p 
131).   Smith identifies both physical and psychological harms which could result for the 
saviour child conceived following tissue-typing procedures.  While scientific evidence 
indicates that the embryo biopsy procedure is not physically harmful to the embryo (p 140), 
the psychological harm which may be suffered by a saviour child is more difficult to dismiss.  
Smith notes that, inevitably, a saviour child is born into a family with an existing health crisis 
and may face further psychological stress as a result of finding out that they were born as a 
saviour child, particularly if any treatment which follows tissue donation is unsuccessful (p 
143).  He compares this situation with that of any child born into a family facing a health 
crisis, who may or may not be intended as a tissue donor, concluding that the psychological 
harm does not justify interfering with reproductive liberty, as long as the intention of creating 
the child is not only to cure a sick relative.  He considers it important, if not essential, that the 
child will be a welcome and desired member of the family, and will be appropriately nurtured 
and cared for, with additional psychological support if necessary.  However, this view does 
not necessarily follow an assessment of harm at the pre-conception stage. While 
psychological harm might be foreseen, Smith argues that the harm is not significant enough 
to tip the balance in favour of restricting reproductive liberty. However, he does not identify 
the relevant tipping-point where foreseeable psychological harm could justify interference. 
 
Having examined the notion of harm, Smith goes on to look at the moral and ethical 
arguments which often underpin regulatory decision making.  He identifies three issues; the 
moral status of the embryo, commodification, and the ‘slippery slope’ to designer babies.  
Regarding the moral status of the embryo, Smith is quick to dismiss this argument given the 
widespread acceptability of IVF procedures which regularly involve the creation of surplus 
embryos (p 170).  The means-to-an-end objection is similarly overcome - saviour children 
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may be welcomed as much-loved additions to families rather than being regarded as 
commodities (p 172).  Smith also points to the birth of unplanned children in naturally 
conceiving families as evidence that children are not viewed simply for their ability to cure a 
sibling or other relative, thus concluding that this moral argument does not justify 
interference with reproductive liberty.  However, this argument does not address the situation 
of all families who may be reluctant to extend their families for social or financial reasons, 
but who are desperate to cure a sick child.  Sadly, not all children are desired and accepted 
into loving families and children can be considered a burden on families, adding social and 
financial pressures where there is already an existing health crisis.  The final argument of the 
‘slippery slope’ to designer babies is also dismissed using Feinberg’s reasoning that to cause 
‘harm’ in this way would involve setting back the interests of others.17  Smith argues that in 
the context of designer babies, it is not possible to identify anyone who could have their 
interests set back sufficiently by the creation of a saviour child to justify state interference 
under the harm principle (p 179). 
 
In his final chapter, Smith proposes a new structure for the regulation of tissue-typing 
technology to create saviour children.18  He criticises the approach in Australia, in particular, 
as being too grounded in moral and ethical arguments which do not justify interference with 
reproductive liberty based on the harm principle.  He also revisits his arguments about the 
overly-restrictive statutory criteria which limit access to treatment.  Smith suggests an 
approach which is less restrictive than the current UK position, which requires that a saviour 
may be conceived only where the sibling (it must be a sibling) can be treated with tissue from 
umbilical cord stem cells, bone marrow or other tissue not including whole organs,19 arguing 
that safeguards post-birth are adequate to prevent harm being inflicted on the saviour child, 
which should not prevent its conception (p 185). He also criticises the need for a sibling to be 
suffering a serious condition before a saviour can be conceived, arguing that there is no 
justification in the harm principle for this restriction because the potential resulting harm is 
often less in the case of a less serious condition.  This is because the resulting child is less 
likely to be subjected to repeated donation procedures because the sick child’s condition will 
be more easily treated (p 188). 
 
What Smith ultimately proposes is a case-by-case welfare assessment made following 
guidance on six key factors (p 198): (1) the starting point is recognition that there is some 
need for a regulatory response. However, (2) there should be a presumption in favour of 
access to treatment, (3) speculative risks should not be considered serious enough to restrict 
access to treatment, (4) cases should be considered on a case by case basis, rather than on 
broader ethical principles, (5) information and counselling should be provided in order to 
minimise risks of harm, and (6) risk assessments should not be burdensome to ART 
providers, as the welfare of prospective children is already taken into account during the ART 
process. Smith’s approach is a firmly rooted permissive view under which access to treatment 
would be granted in almost every case and it is difficult to think of situations where 
restrictions on access to treatment would be justified.  While straightforward on the face of it, 
this process may be over-simplistic in the context of treatment which can have severe 
emotional and psychological consequences for those involved. Smith has stated in his criteria 
that speculative risks should not be relied on to restrict access to treatment, but conducting a 
risk assessment at the pre-conception stage is always going to require a degree of speculation.   
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Only restricting access to treatment in cases where harm is clearly foreseeable, or inevitable 
(it is not clear what level of certainty Smith requires), exposes prospective children to risks 
that may be unnecessary and avoidable, particularly given the emotional and psychological 
effects of ART treatment services. 
 
Smith’s book sets out an argument for revisiting the regulatory framework governing saviour 
children.  He uses moral and ethical reasoning to justify the position that reproductive liberty 
should be free from state interference except where there is evidence of serious harm.  
However, whilst Smith argues strongly for a liberal approach to regulation, he bases this 
solely on a narrow concept of harm to the resulting child.  He does not discuss in detail the 
other ethical and moral positions underpinning regulation in this area, such as those who 
object to ART on religious grounds or the utilitarian position that access to treatment should 
be determined by determining how the greatest benefit can be delivered to the greatest 
number of people.  He does not consider wider ethical and societal opposition to tissue-typing 
where it falls outside the concept of harm.  Thus, this book gives a rather narrow view of the 
complex moral arguments underpinning the regulation of this area of law.  However, it does 
provide a useful overview of regulation and the law relating to the creation of saviour 
children, and will be of use to students and academics with an interest in this area.   
 
